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Introduction
In 2012, there were 16.3 homicides per 100 000 population 
in the Americas as a whole and 26.5 per 100 000 in Central 
America.1 Gang-related violence accounts for an estimated 
70% of the homicides in El Salvador and for similarly large 
proportions of the homicides in Honduras and Guatemala.2 
Some academics have attributed the relationship between 
gangs and violence to the collective and normative structure 
of gangs, which encourages and supports the use of both pre-
emptive and retaliatory violence.3 When gang culture assumes 
violence to be the only effective response to actual or perceived 
threats and attacks, the result is spiralling inter-gang conflict 
and escalating violence.3 For example, a perceived slight vio-
lation of a gang’s turf or another sign of apparent disrespect 
may trigger a shooting that evokes a retaliatory shooting that, 
in turn, elicits another retaliatory shooting.4
In general, policy-makers have relied on the police to 
respond to violent gang conflicts that result in homicides. 
However, this practice has several shortcomings. First, 
gang members are unlikely to contact the police to resolve 
a conflict when doing so would result in loss of status and 
possible exposure of illegal activities to the police.5 Second, 
the residents of neighbourhoods with gang problems are 
often reluctant to call the police for fear of gang reprisal6 
and often have a poor perception of the police.7 Third, the 
police typically operate by responding reactively to specific 
incidents rather than proactively to the ongoing problem of 
disputes between gangs.8
Some policy-makers and community activists have sug-
gested the gang truce as an alternative to reliance on the police.9 
As a nonviolent resolution to larger conflicts between gangs, 
the gang truce can have an impact on general levels of violence 
and other forms of criminality within communities.10–12 The 
goal of such a truce is to reduce or even eliminate violent 
conflict between gangs, by renegotiating existing norms within 
and between the gangs.13 As a violent dispute escalates between 
gangs, any leaders and members who do not respond with 
an appropriate amount of force risk appearing weak both to 
members of their own gang and to members of rival gangs.13 
As the cycle of violence escalates between gangs, behavioural 
norms shift towards the increased valuation of violence for 
resolving conflicts – because violence becomes the most readily 
available and widely understood option.13 A gang truce, which 
is often mediated by a third party, is believed to be capable 
of breaking such a cycle of violence – in part, by providing 
the disputing gangs with a cooling-off period during which 
different, less harmful norms of expected behaviour may be 
established within and between the gangs.9,13
There has been little research on the effectiveness of gang 
truces. Studies of a truce, in south-central Los Angeles, United 
States of America, made between the Crips and the Bloods 
gangs in 1992, revealed temporary reductions in the num-
ber of homicides and gunshot wounds during the truce.10,14 
However, the initial reports of these studies failed to point 
out that, although there was a 35% decrease in the homicide 
rate for the first three months of the truce, that rate doubled in 
the following eight months.11 A similar boomerang effect was 
reported in a study of a gang truce in Trinidad and Tobago.15 It 
appears that gang truces may produce short-term benefits but 
have adverse consequences in the long term. In this article, we 
report the results of the first large-scale quasi-experimental 
study of a government-facilitated gang truce that was designed 
to reduce the number of homicides.
Objective To estimate the effects on homicide rates of the gang truce that was brokered in El Salvador in 2012.
Methods Mathematical models based on municipal-level census, crime and gang-intelligence data were used to estimate the effect of the 
truce on homicide rates. One model estimated the overall effect after accounting for the linear trend and seasonality in the homicide rate. 
In a moderated-effect model, we investigated the relationship between the truce effect and the numbers of MS13 (Mara Salvatrucha 13) 
and Eighteenth-Street gang members imprisoned per 100 000 population. We then ran each of these two models with additional control 
variables. We compared values before the truce – 1 January 2010 to 29 February 2012 – with those after the truce – 1 March 2012 to 31 
December 2013.
Findings The overall-effect models with and without additional control variables indicated a homicide rate after the truce that was significantly 
lower than the value before the truce, giving rate ratios of 0.55 (95% confidence interval, CI: 0.49–0.63) and 0.61 (95% CI: 0.54–0.69), 
respectively. For any given municipality, the effectiveness of the truce appeared to increase as the number of MS13 gang members imprisoned 
per 100 000 population increased. We did not observe the same significant relationship for imprisoned Eighteenth-Street gang members.
Conclusion In the 22 months following the establishment of a national gang truce, the homicide rate was about 40% lower than in the 
preceding 26 months. The truce’s impact appeared particularly strong in municipalities with relatively high numbers of imprisoned MS13 
gang members per 100 000 population.
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Methods
Setting
We analysed data from El Salvador, 
where homicide is defined as a death 
deliberately inflicted on a person by 
another person.1 Between 2000 and 
2011, the homicide rate in El Salvador 
increased from 39.3 to 69.2 per 100 000 
population1 and El Salvador became 
one of the most violent nations in the 
world.16 About 44% of the country’s 
homicides occur in just 10 (3.8%) of the 
country’s 262 municipalities.2
In early 2012, members of the 
national government, then headed by 
President Mauricio Funes, led a group of 
negotiators, including a former United 
States congressman and members of the 
Catholic Church and the Organization 
of the American States, in framing the 
conditions for a truce between the MS13 
(Mara Salvatrucha 13) and Eighteenth-
Street gangs – that is, the two gangs that, 
together, represent 99% of gang mem-
bers in El Salvador.17 By March 2012, 
an agreement between this group and 
representatives of the gangs had been 
reached. The primary goal of the gang 
truce was to reduce violence in general 
and homicides in particular. The terms, 
which were all implemented for both 
gangs, included that, in exchange for 
the gangs acting to reduce homicides, 
certain imprisoned gang members 
would be transferred to lower-security 
prisons, receive special visitation privi-
leges and be permitted communication 
with those outside the prison – so that 
they could conduct crisis interventions 
to mitigate gang violence.18 Gang leaders 
also agreed to stop recruiting children, 
reduce violence against women and 
continue to participate in further ne-
gotiations.19
Data
We examined the impact of the gang 
truce by linking four data sets. First, 
data from the Salvadorian Ministry of 
the Economy’s 2007 population and 
housing census provided municipal-
level measures of community social 
structure. Second, municipal-level 
crime data for extortion, homicide, rape, 
robbery, theft, vehicle theft and vehicle 
robbery were provided – by month for 
the period between 1 January 2010 and 
30 June 2014 – by the national civil 
police force. Data on the disappearance 
of individuals, aggregated by year and 
municipality, were also provided by the 
police. We examined the reliability of 
the police homicide data by comparing 
it with the homicide data collected, inde-
pendently, by the Salvadorian Institute 
of Legal Medicine, which is a forensic 
science centre; for the other crime types 
of interest, we had no means to assess the 
extent of unreporting. Third, estimates 
of the numbers of MS13 and Eighteenth-
Street gang members present in each 
municipality in 2011 were provided 
by the police. Last, we acquired, from 
the Directorate General of Prisons, the 
numbers of MS13 and Eighteenth-Street 
members imprisoned in each munici-
pality in 2011. In 2011, about 55.6% of 
prisoners in El Salvador were members 
of one of these two gangs.2
The municipal–month was our 
primary unit of analysis. As we had 54 
months of data for each of the 262 mu-
nicipalities in the nation, we had 12 576 
data points. The official crime data were 
collected for the 26 months (1 January 
2010 to 29 February 2012) before the 
implementation of the gang truce and 
the 22 months (1 March 2012 to 31 De-
cember 2013) that immediately followed 
the implementation. The variables listed 
in Table 1 were used as controls in two of 
our mathematical models because they 
have consistently been associated with 
both violence and gang violence.20 Our 
measure of ethnic heterogeneity, which 
could vary from 0 to 1, was calculated 
by subtracting the sum of the squared 
proportions of the population in each 
ethnic group from a value of 1.21
We included, as count variables, the 
numbers of MS13 and Eighteenth-Street 
gang members who were on the streets 
and in prison within each municipality. 
Our aim was to see if the impact of the 
truce was affected by the level of gang 
presence – i.e. to see if municipalities 
with high numbers of MS13 and Eigh-
teenth-Street gang members, whether 
in prison or on the street, experienced 
a relatively large reduction in the homi-
cide rates because the two gangs had a 
greater span of control in such munici-
palities. We controlled for the observed 
spatial clustering in the number of 








Rented 13.0 8.0 (4.8)
Urban 62.7 39.7 (24.6)
% of population
Born in another municipality 23.7 18.9 (12.2)
Educated to at least secondary level 12.6 7.4 (6.6)
In female-headed household 34.8 34.3 (5.0)
Male aged 10–29 years 19.1 19.6 (1.7)
Unemployed 11.6 11.8 (6.9)
Gang representation
Eighteenth-Street
    No. of prisoners 3323.0 12.7 (41.0)
    No. of prisoners per 100 000 residents 57.9 28.7 (57.9)
    No. of members on the street 6585.0 25.1 (86.2)
    No. of members on the street per 100 000 residents 114.6 57.9 (160.7)
MS13
    No. of prisoners 4139.0 15.8 (39.6)
    No. of prisoners per 100 000 residents 72.1 44.7 (51.4)
    No. of members on the street 11 000 41.5 (106.5)
    No. of members on the street per 100 000 residents 189.1 114.6 (204.6)
Municipality participation in VFMP 0.1 0.0 (0.2)
Per-capita income, US$ 789.2 546.4 (265.4)
Population 5 744 113 22 000 (38 000)
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity 0.2 0.7 (0.1)
SD: standard deviation; US$: United States dollars; VFMP: Violence-free Municipality Programme.
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imprisoned MS13 and Eighteenth-Street 
members by including the spatial lag of 
such gang members in our final models.
To estimate the effect of the truce, 
we used a predictor variable coded as 0 
or 1 – to represent, respectively, the pre-
truce and post-truce months for each 
municipality. Eleven municipalities had 
participated in a separate initiative, the 
Violence-Free Municipality Programme, 
in which gang members agreed to stop 
violence in exchange for a reduction 
in police operations.22 We included a 
dummy variable for each of these com-
munities, for all months.
Analysis
We investigated trends in the homicide 
rates and conducted a simple t-test 
comparison of the mean numbers – per 
100 000 population per month – of ho-
micides and of each of the other types 
of crime we investigated in the study 
periods before and after the truce. We 
created a cross-sectional time-series 
model to estimate the overall effect of 
the truce after accounting for linear 
trends and seasonality. We then con-
ducted a detailed analysis of the truce’s 
effects, at the municipal level, using 
four mixed-effect negative binomial 
regression models. All four models used 
a population offset effect and included 
temporal and spatial lags to control for 
autocorrelation. The first model esti-
mated an overall effect after accounting 
for linear trends and seasonality. The 
second model investigated how the 
truce effect was moderated by inclusion 
of natural logs of the number of MS13 
or Eighteenth-Street gang members im-
prisoned per 100 000 population. Each 
of these two models was then rerun with 
the inclusion of additional control vari-
ables (Table 1). Due to space limitations 
and the fact that many of the control 
variables were not found to be statisti-
cally significant, we do not report the full 
regression models. However, the effects 
of the truce and the effects moderated 
by municipal-level gang presence in the 
prisons were found to be significant and 
are therefore reported as the ratios of 
the rates of homicide before the truce to 
the corresponding rates after the truce 
was agreed.
In our final analysis we considered 
two types of displacement: displace-
ment by crime type and displacement 
by crime method. Crime-type displace-
ment occurs when offenders who focus 
on one form of crime switch to another 
form of crime to avoid detection or to 
benefit in some other way.23 Crime-
method displacement occurs when, 
because of an intervention, offenders 
change their tactics or methods of con-
ducting crimes.23 Some critics of the Sal-
vadorian gang truce have suggested that 
as homicides decreased, other forms of 
criminality – e.g. extortion – might have 
increased because of gang members’ 
increased freedom to conduct activi-
ties inside and outside prison.16 Others 
have argued that gang members hid the 
bodies of homicide victims to avoid 
detection and to protect the integrity of 
the country’s gang truce.24
Results
Analysis showed no significant differ-
ence between the homicide data pro-
vided by the police and that collected 
by the Institute of Legal Medicine. The 
level of correlation between the two data 
sets was found to be 0.995.
The mean number of monthly 
homicides declined from about 354 
before the truce to about 218 follow-
ing the truce, giving a net decrease of 
about 136 homicides per month. Fig. 1 
presents the number of police-recorded 
homicides in El Salvador over the study 
period. The period right after the start 
of the truce shows a sharp decline in 
the recorded homicide rate. When we 
compared a prediction of the number 
of homicides in the truce period, based 
on the data before the truce, with the 
number of homicides recorded in the 
same period, we found that the truce 




















Forecast if no truce Start of truce
Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Jan Feb Mar Apr MayJun Jul AugSep Oct NovDec Jan Feb Mar Apr MayJun Jul AugSep Oct NovDec Jan Feb Mar Apr MayJun Jul AugSep Oct NovDec Jan Feb Mar Apr MayJun Jul AugSep Oct NovDec Jan Feb MarAprMayJun
Note: The plot shows the number of homicides recorded by the Salvadorian national civil police force and, for the period after the truce was agreed, the numbers 
of homicides that might have been expected if the trends recorded before the truce had remained unchanged.
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had prevented about 5500 homicides – 
assuming that all other relevant factors 
remained constant.
Table 2 presents the mean val-
ues and standard deviations for the 
numbers and rates – per 100 000 
population – of disappearances, ex-
tortions, homicides, robberies, rapes, 
thefts and vehicular crimes for the 
municipal-months before and after 
the truce began. Based on these mean 
values, it appears that, after the truce 
was agreed, the rates of homicide and 
extortion were significantly lower than 
before the truce (P < 0.001) whereas the 
rate of rape was significantly higher 
(P = 0.012). However, as the mean val-
ues fail to capture any trends before the 
truce, they do not allow the significant 
differences to be attributed to the truce.
In our basic regression models, 
which we used to adjust for any trends 
before the truce, we still found that the 
rates of homicide per 100 000 population 
– but not those of any other crime we 
investigated – were significantly lower 
after the truce than before (P = 0.002; 
Table 2). As a result, we used a more 
detailed model to analyse the possible 
effect of the truce on homicide rates. 
Inclusion in the overall-effect model 
of adjustments for multiple potential 
confounders reduced our calculated 
rate ratios – for the homicide rate per 
100 000 population – from 0.61 (95% 
confidence interval, CI: 0.54–0.69) to 
0.55 (95% CI: 0.49–0.63; Table 3; avail-
able at: http://www.who.int/bulletin/
volumes/94/9/15-166314). 
The moderation coefficient for the 
interaction between the truce and the 
municipal-level rate of imprisonment 
of gang members per 100 000 popula-
tion was only significant for the MS13 
gang – not for the Eighteenth-Street. 
We found that the effectiveness of the 
truce, in reducing the homicide rate in 
a municipality, increased as the number 
of imprisoned MS13 gang members per 
100 000 residents of that municipality 
increased. For example, in a munici-
pality with 10 imprisoned MS13 gang 
members per 100 000 residents, the 
effect of the intervention was similar 
to the overall effect. In municipalities 
with 400 imprisoned MS13 gang mem-
bers per 100 000 residents, however, 
there appeared to be a 70% reduction 
(Table 3 available at: http://www.who.
int/bulletin/volumes/94/9/15-166314) 
in the corresponding homicide rate. This 
pattern remained substantially similar 
whether we made adjustments for mul-
tiple potential confounders or not.
We found no evidence of displace-
ment by crime type or crime method. 
When temporal trends were included 
in the autoregressive models, we found 
no significant difference between the 
pre-truce rates of extortion, rape, rob-
bery, theft or vehicular crime and the 
corresponding rates after the truce. In 
the period after the truce was agreed, 
annualized rates of disappearance ap-
peared slightly higher than in the pre-
truce period. However, the difference in 
rates did not appear to be statistically 
significant when investigated in a t-test 
(Table 2). Furthermore, analysis of the 
same data in a more complex autoregres-
sive model with adjustment for temporal 
trends indicated that the gang truce had 
not caused an increase but a significant 
decrease in the rate of disappearance 
(Table 2).
Discussion
Our findings indicate that – even after 
controlling for potentially confound-
ing municipal-level socioeconomic 
variables, the presence of other gang 
interventions and spatial lags in gang 
presence – El Salvador’s gang truce 
significantly reduced the homicide 
rate and did not result in significant 
Table 2. Levels of crime before and after the gang truce, El Salvador, 2010–2013






Pre-truced Post-trucee Difference P
No. of disappearances 3.01 (10.39) 3.31 (8.20) 0.30 0.32 −2.87 0.00
No. of disappearances per 100 000 residents 8.07 (15.32) 9.35 (13.00) 1.27 0.10 −9.03 0.00
No. of extortions 1.16 (3.97) 0.90 (3.20) −0.26 0.00 0.00 0.92
No. of extortions per 100 000 residents 3.47 (7.69) 2.65 (6.63) −0.81 0.00 −0.01 0.71
No. of homicides 1.35 (3.16) 0.74 (1.76) −0.61 0.00 −0.07 0.00
No. of homicides per 100 000 residents 4.21 (8.03) 2.86 (6.55) −1.4 0.00 −0.22 0.00
No. of rapes 0.11 (0.42) 0.12 (0.43) 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.99
No. of rapes per 100 000 residents 0.50 (2.74) 0.66 (3.78) 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.99
No. of robberies 1.77 (8.11) 1.73 (7.10) −0.05 0.46 0.00 0.86
No. of robberies per 100 000 residents 5.36 (9.67) 5.47 (9.46) 0.12 0.55 0.00 1.00
No. of thefts 3.25 (12.42) 3.13 (11.71) −0.12 0.06 0.00 0.87
No. of thefts per 100 000 residents 12.32 (17.15) 11.98 (16.77) −0.34 0.29 −0.01 0.95
No. of vehicle robberies or thefts 1.16 (8.06) 1.13 (7.36) −0.03 0.58 0.00 0.97
No. of vehicle robberies or thefts per 100 000 
residents
1.71 (12.59) 1.59 (5.35) −0.12 0.79 0.00 0.95
SD: standard deviation.
a  Post-truce mean minus pre-truce mean.
b  From a t-test corrected for correlated observations within municipalities
c  Corrected for correlated observations within municipalities, autocorrelation across time and trend and heteroskedastic effects across municipalities.
d  1 January 2010 – 29 February 2012.
e  1 March 2012 – 31 December 2013.
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displacement by crime type or method. 
Our findings also show that the truce 
had a particularly beneficial effect on 
homicides in the municipalities that had 
relatively high numbers of imprisoned 
MS13 gang members. Prior research 
has indicated that imprisoned mem-
bers of the MS13 gang have substantial 
influence over violence in Salvadorian 
communities25 – perhaps even more 
than the police and courts.26 MS13 is 
perhaps one of the most organizationally 
sophisticated street gangs in the Western 
Hemisphere.26 It has a vertical organiza-
tional structure and strong control over 
criminal enterprises in gang-controlled 
neighbourhoods and, although much of 
its leadership is imprisoned, it remains 
capable of enforcing its own rules.27 Our 
findings indicate that imprisoned MS13 
gang leaders retain a strong influence 
over more junior gang members on the 
street. Although MS13 and Eighteenth-
Street may be generally similar,26 there 
was a conflict between two factions 
within Eighteenth-Street during our 
study period (G Perseu, personal com-
munication, 2014) and this may have 
weakened the gang’s leadership struc-
ture – to the point that the imprisoned 
leaders may have had less influence over 
violence by members on the street than 
their counterparts in MS13.
Unfortunately, the homicide rate 
began to increase slowly about 12 
months after the truce was agreed and 
had approached levels recorded before 
the truce after a further 16 months. In 
2014 a new government announced 
that imprisoned gang leaders would no 
longer receive any benefits of the truce. 
Following this declaration – and after 
our study period – homicide rates in El 
Salvador increased to record highs.28 It 
seems possible that the truce may have 
increased gang cohesion. It has been 
suggested that the government officials 
who negotiate gang truce might inad-
vertently be acknowledging gangs as 
legitimate social entities.29 By increas-
ing cohesion within gangs, this may, in 
the long term at least, lead to increased 
levels of criminality.29,30 In some devel-
oping nations, gang leaders and elected 
officials may have similar levels of power 
and authority.31–33
In conclusion, we found that the 
Salvadorian gang truce agreed in March 
2012 had a beneficial but short-lived 
impact on the homicide rate. However, 
the truce lasted longer than any other 
successfully negotiated gang truce.11,15 
The Salvadorian truce appeared so suc-
cessful that several other countries – e.g. 
Belize, Guatemala and Honduras – have 
sought to replicate it.34,35 In the future, 
before evaluating whether a truce strat-
egy might be appropriate in a country, 
policy-makers should evaluate whether 
the conditions that allowed short-term 
success of the gang truce in El Salvador 
exist in other violent areas. They should 
also be warned that the potential for 
long-term negative consequences might 
outweigh any potential short-term 
benefits. ■
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صخلم
رودافلسلا في فنعلا عنلم تاباصعلا ينب ةندلها ةماقإ
 ينب ةندلها ةجيتن لتقلا  مئارج لدعم لىع تايرثأتلا  ريدقت ضرغلا
.2012 ماع رودافلسلا في اهتماقإ تتم يتلا تاباصعلا
 دادعتب ةقلعتلما تانايبلا لىإ دنتست ةيضاير جذمان مادختسا مت ةقيرطلا
 ةيرابختسلاا تامولعلماو مئارلجاو تايدلبلا ىوتسم لىع ناكسلا
 .لتقلا  مئارج  تلادعم  لىع  ةندلها  يرثأت  ريدقتل  تاباصعلا  نع
 يطلخا  هاتجلاا  يرسفت  دعب  ليكلا  يرثأتلا  ريدقتب  دحاو  جذومن  ماق
 تاذ جذمانلا دحأ فيو .لتقلا مئارج لدعم في ةيمسولما تاّيرغتلاو
 دادعأو ةندلها  يرثأت  ينب ةقلاعلا  في قيقحتلاب  انمق ،طسوتلما  يرثأتلا
 اشتورتاڤاس  اترام(  ”13  سإ  مإ“  ةباصع  دارفأ  نم  يننوجسلما
 .ناكسلا نم 100,000 لكل ”شرع نيماثلا عراشلا“ ةباصعو )13
 ةطباضلا  تايرغتلما  عم  ينجذومنلا  نيذه  لاك  ضرعب  انمق  مث
 اًءدب  –  ةندلها  ةماقإ  لبق  ةرداصلا  ميقلا  ةنراقمب  انمقو  .ةيفاضلإا
 طابش/ريابرف 29  موي  ىتح 2010  نياثلا  نوناك/رياني  1  موي  نم
 1 موي نم اًءدب – ةندلها ةماقإ دعب ةرداصلا ميقلا كلت عم – 2012
.2013 لولأا نوناك/برمسيد 31 موي ىتح 2012 راذآ/سرام
 ةطباضلا  تايرغتلماب  ةدوزلما  ليكلا  يرثأتلا  تاذ  جذمانلا  نإ  جئاتنلا
 لتقلا مئارج لدعم نأ لىإ تراشأ – ابه ةدوزلما يرغ وأ – ةيفاضلإا
 مئارلجا لدعم ةميق نم يرثكب لقأ ناك ةندلها ةماقإ دعب تثدح يتلا
 ةبسنب(  0.55  غلبت  تلادعم  بسن  لىع  لدي  امم  ،ةندلها  ةماقإ  لبق
 ةيحجرأ ةبسنب(  0.61و )0.63–0.49 :95%  اهرادقم ةيحجرأ
 نم  يلأ  ةبسنلابو  .لياوتلا  لىع  ،)0.69–0.54  :% 95  اهرادقم
 يننوجسلما ددع عفترا ثيح دادزي ةندلها يرثأت نأ ادب دقف ،تايدلبلا
 لم  مانيب  .ناكسلا  نم  100,000  لكل  ”13  سإ  مإ“  ةباصع  نم
 يننوجسلما  دارفلأل  اهسفن  ةيئاصحلإا  ةللادلا  تاذ  ةقلاعلا  ظحلن
.”شرع نيماثلا عراشلا“ ةباصع نم
 اًرهش 22 ـلا في 40% لياوحب لقأ لتقلا مئارج لدعم ناك جاتنتسلاا
 ناك  امم  ،ينطولا  ىوتسلما  لىع  تاباصعلا  ينب  ةنده  ةماقلإ  ةيلاتلا
 صاخ لكشب اًيوق ةندلها يرثأت نأ ادبو .ةقباسلا اًرهش 26 ـلا في هيلع
 نم يننوجسلما دارفلأا نم اًيبسن ةيربك اًدادعأ مضت يتلا تايدلبلا في
.ناكسلا نم 100,000 لكل ”13 سإ مإ“ ةباصع
摘要
帮派停战协议对萨尔瓦多暴力预防的意义






究了停战协议的成效与每 100 000 人中入狱的救世鳟
鱼帮 (MS13) 和十八街黑帮成员人数之间的关系。 然
后，我们采用其他控制变量分别运行了这两个模型。 
我们比较了停战协议之前的数值——2010 年 1 月 1 日
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至 2012 年 2 月 29 日——与停战协议之后的数值——
2012 年 3 月 1 日至 2013 年 12 月 31 日。
结果 采用和不采用其他控制变量的总体效应模型
表明停战协议之后的凶杀率显著低于停战协议之
前，比率分别达到 0.55（95％ 置信区间，CI: 0.49–
0.63） 和 0.61 (95% CI: 0.54–0.69)。 对于任何指定的直




结论 在全国帮派停战协议签订之后的 22 个月内，凶
杀率相较于之前的 26 个月降低了 40% 左右。 在
每 100 000 人中入狱的 MS13 帮成员人数相对较高的直
辖市中，停战协议的成效尤为显著。
Résumé
Une trêve des gangs pour prévenir la violence, El Salvador
Objectif Estimer les effets sur le taux d’homicide de la trêve des gangs 
qui a été signée au Salvador en 2012.
Méthodes Des modèles mathématiques établis d’après les 
recensements municipaux et les renseignements sur les gangs et la 
criminalité ont été utilisés pour estimer l’effet de la trêve sur le taux 
d’homicide. Un modèle a permis d’en estimer l’effet global après prise en 
compte de la tendance linéaire et de la saisonnalité du taux d’homicide. 
Un modèle à effets modérés nous a permis d’étudier la relation entre 
l’effet de la trêve et le nombre de membres emprisonnés des gangs 
MS13 (Mara Salvatrucha 13) et Barrio 18 pour 100 000 habitants. Nous 
avons ensuite soumis chacun de ces deux modèles à des variables de 
contrôle supplémentaire. Nous avons comparé les valeurs d’avant la 
trêve – du 1er janvier 2010 au 29 février 2012 – à celles d’après la trêve 
– du 1er mars 2012 au 31 décembre 2013.
Résultats Les modèles d’estimation de l’effet global, avec et sans 
variables de contrôle supplémentaire, ont indiqué un taux d’homicide 
après la trêve nettement inférieur aux valeurs d’avant la trêve, avec des 
ratios de taux respectifs de 0,55 (intervalle de confiance de 95%, IC: 0,49-
0,63) et 0,61 (IC 95%: 0,54-0,69). Quelle que soit la municipalité, l’efficacité 
de la trêve grandissait au fur et à mesure que le nombre de membres 
emprisonnés du gang MS13 pour 100 000 habitants augmentait. Nous 
n’avons pas observé de rapport aussi significatif pour les membres 
emprisonnés du gang Barrio 18.
Conclusion Pendant les 22 mois qui ont suivi l’établissement d’une trêve 
nationale des gangs, le taux d’homicide était environ 40% plus faible que 
lors des 26 mois précédents. L’impact de la trêve était particulièrement 
marqué dans les municipalités où le nombre de membres emprisonnés 
du gang MS13 pour 100 000 habitants était relativement élevé.
Резюме
Перемирие между уличными бандами для прекращения насилия, Сальвадор
Цель Дать оценку влияния перемирия между бандами, 
заключенного в Сальвадоре в 2012 году, на показатели числа 
убийств.
Методы Оценка влияния перемирия на показатели числа 
убийств была дана с помощью математических моделей на 
основе переписных данных муниципального уровня, данных о 
преступности и разведывательных данных о бандах. С помощью 
одной модели общее влияние рассчитывалось после учета 
линейного тренда и сезонных колебаний показателей числа 
убийств. В модели модифицированного влияния были изучены 
связи между влиянием перемирия и количеством членов банды 
MS13 (Мара Сальватруча 13 (Mara Salvatrucha 13)) и банды 18-й 
улицы (Eighteenth-Street), заключенных в тюрьму, из расчета 
на 100 000 жителей. Затем обе эти модели были реализованы 
с дополнительными контрольными переменными. Значения, 
относящиеся к периоду до перемирия (от 1 января 2010 года 
до 29 февраля 2012 года), были сравнены со значениями, 
относящимися к периоду после перемирия (от 1 марта 2012 года 
до 31 декабря 2013 года).
Результаты  Реализация моделей общего влияния с 
дополнительными контрольными переменными и без них 
показала, что уровни числа убийств после перемирия 
были значительно меньше значений до него. В результате 
были получены отношения рисков, равные 0,55 (95%-й 
доверительный интервал, ДИ: 0,49–0,63) и 0,61 (95%-й ДИ: 0,54–
0,69) соответственно. Для каждого муниципального образования 
было выявлено, что эффективность перемирия напрямую 
зависела от того, сколько членов банды MS13, заключенных под 
стражу, приходилось на 100 000 жителей. Такая же заметная связь 
с количеством заключенных под стражу членов банды 18-й улицы 
не наблюдалась.
Вывод Через 22 месяца после заключения национального 
перемирия между бандами показатели убийств снизились 
приблизительно на 40% по сравнению с предыдущими 
26 месяцами. Влияние перемирия оказалось особенно сильным 
в муниципальных образованиях с относительно большим 
количеством заключенных в тюрьму членов банды MS13 (из 
расчета на 100 000 жителей).
Resumen
Tregua entre bandas para la prevención de la violencia, El Salvador
Objetivo Estimar el impacto en las tasas de homicidio de la tregua entre 
bandas negociada en El Salvador en 2012.
Métodos Se utilizaron modelos matemáticos basados en un censo 
municipal, datos sobre crímenes e inteligencia de bandas para 
estimar el impacto de la tregua en las tasas de homicidio. Un modelo 
calculó el impacto general tras tener en cuenta la tendencia lineal y 
la estacionalidad de las tasas de homicidio. En un modelo de efecto 
moderado, se investigó la relación entre el efecto de la tregua y el 
número de miembros de las bandas MS13 (Mara Salvatrucha 13) y 
Calle 18 en prisión por cada 100 000 habitantes. Posteriormente, se 
implementaron ambos modelos con variables de control adicionales. 
Se compararon los valores antes de la tregua (del 1 de enero de 2010 
al 29 de febrero de 2012) y los de después de la tregua (del 1 de marzo 
de 2012 al 31 de diciembre de 2013).
Resultados Los modelos de efecto general con y sin variables de 
control adicionales indicaron que la tasa de homicidio posterior a la 
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tregua fue mucho menor que el valor antes de la misma, lo que ofrece 
coeficientes de la tasa del 0,55% (intervalo de confianza, IC, del 95%: 
0,49-0,63) y del 0,61 (IC del 95%: 0,54-0,69), respectivamente. En todos 
los municipios, la eficacia de la tregua parecía aumentar a medida que 
aumentaba el número de miembros de la MS13 encarcelados por cada 
100 000 habitantes. No se observó la misma relación significativa para 
los miembros de la Calle 18 encarcelados.
Conclusión Durante los 22 meses posteriores al establecimiento 
de una tregua nacional entre bandas, la tasa de homicidio fue un 
40% inferior que en los 26 meses anteriores. El impacto de la tregua 
fue especialmente significativo en los municipios con un número 
relativamente alto de miembros de la MS13 encarcelados por cada 
100 000 habitantes.
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Table 3. Homicide rate ratios derived from statistical models, El Salvador, 2010–2013
Modela Homicide rate ratio (95% CI)b
Without controls With controlsc
Overall effect 0.61 (0.54–0.69) 0.55 (0.49–0.63)
Moderated effectsd
No. of imprisoned Eighteenth-Street gang 
members per 100 000 residents
    10 1.14 (0.91–1.43) 1.13 (0.90–1.43)
    50 1.23 (0.95–1.60) 1.22 (0.94–1.59)
    100 1.27 (0.96–1.68) 1.26 (0.96–1.67)
    200 1.31 (0.97–1.78) 1.31 (0.97–1.76)
    400 1.36 (0.98–1.88) 1.35 (0.98–1.87)
No. of imprisoned MS13 gang members per 
100 000 residents
    10 0.62 (0.53–0.72) 0.61 (0.52–0.72)
    50 0.45 (0.37–0.54) 0.44 (0.37–0.53)
    100 0.39 (0.32–0.48) 0.38 (0.31–0.47)
    200 0.34 (0.27–0.42) 0.33 (0.27–0.42)
    400 0.29 (0.23–0.38) 0.29 (0.22–0.37)
CI: confidence interval.
a  All models were mixed-effect negative binomial regressions with a population offset, a random intercept 
and random slope for the effect of the truce on homicide rates, a two-month lag and a spatial lag on the 
homicide rate, a linear time trend and indicators for the calendar month.
b  The ratio of the number of homicides per 100 000 residents in the period before the truce – i.e. 1 January 
2010 to 29 February 2012 – to the corresponding number in the period after the truce – i.e. 1 March 2012 
to 31 December 2013.
c  Controls included the percentages of residents educated to at least secondary school level, unemployed, 
male and aged 10–29 years, living in a female-headed household and/or born in another municipality, 
per-capita income, the percentage of households that were in urban areas and/or rented, measures of 
racial/ethnic heterogeneity and municipality participation in the Violence-free Municipality Programme 
and, for each gang, loge(number of imprisoned gang members per 100 000 residents), loge(number of 
gang members on the street per 100 000 residents) and spatial lags.
d  All moderated models included, for each gang, loge(number of imprisoned gang members per 100 000 
residents), loge(number of gang members on the street per 100 000 residents) and spatial lags.
